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The extent of media coverage of the November 2020 US 
presidential election in Europe is indicative of the 
significance Europeans still attach to US power and 
transatlantic relations. With a few exceptions (London, 
Budapest and Ljubljana), it was with a rather undisguised 
relief that EU capitals welcomed the victory of Joe Biden. 
However, the optimism generated in Europe by the 
return to the Oval Office of a transatlantic-minded 
Democrat should not be synonymous with naivety. The 
Trump era opened Europeans’ eyes on the limits of an 
asymmetric transatlantic relationship. They should not 
forget the lessons learned from that period, nor should 
they slow the progress made towards greater strategic 
autonomy. 
 
Introduced in major EU strategic documents such as the 
2016 Global Strategy (High Representative 2016) and 
widely discussed since then, the concept of ‘strategic 
autonomy’ was more recently defined by Borrell (2020c) 
as “a process of political survival”. Having become central 
in the face of the Trump Administration's ‘America First’ 
foreign policy, “[s]ome people see strategic autonomy as 
a chimera that should be abandoned, especially since Joe 
Biden’s victory” (Borrell 2020b: 1). But the EU must remain 
vigilant not to confine itself to a surrogate role once again. 
Although it could appear paradoxical at first sight, the 
quest for Europe’s strategic autonomy does not 
undermine Biden’s call for a revival of transatlantic 
relations. The objective of a more balanced US-EU 
partnership is coherent with the Biden Administration’s 
transatlantic pledge and key to its leadership restoration 
ambition (White House 2021b). Furthermore, in the face 
of the Covid-19 crisis, ‘strategic autonomy’ is no longer 
confined to the security and defence fields but 
encompasses other issues such as industry and health. It 
should then also become central to a broader range of 
transatlantic cooperation areas and be a catalyst for a 
revived – and redefined – EU-US partnership. 
 
Envisaging the coming period as an opportunity for 
Europeans to transform the transatlantic relationship, this 
policy brief first acknowledges the need for cautious 
optimism vis-à-vis the implications of Biden’s foreign 
policy agenda for transatlantic relations. It then critically 
reflects on the European Commission’s ‘Transatlantic 
Executive Summary 
> Although the return to the White House of a 
transatlantic-minded Democrat is a positive sign for 
the relations between the United States (US) and 
the European Union (EU), the Biden 
Administration’s foreign policy agenda will 
primarily focus on the challenge of restoring US 
leadership without hegemony. 
> The EU must seize this challenge as an opportunity 
for renewing the transatlantic relationship by 
proposing a more balanced partnership as part of 
its quest for ‘strategic autonomy’. In this regard, the 
‘New Transatlantic Agenda’ jointly proposed in 
December 2020 by European Commission President 
von der Leyen and High Representative Borrell 
should serve as a lynchpin for Europeans to 
(re)assert their collective ambitions and propose a 
transformed transatlantic partnership based on 
credibility.  
> This can best be done in two key strategic areas that 
are common to Biden’s foreign policy agenda and 
the EU’s cooperation offer, forming also the two 
pillars of a ‘geopolitical Europe’: trade and security.  
> On trade, the EU should aim for full autonomy to no 
longer be the direct or collateral victim of US 
sanctions, protectionism and trade wars. In the 
security field, the EU should seek to further clarify 
the terms of transatlantic security relations, 
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Agenda’ to conclude with recommendations on trade and 
security policies aiming at a transformed and more 
balanced US-EU relationship in which Europeans’ 
credibility and collective ambitions should carry more 
weight. 
 
Biden’s leadership restoration challenge 
By resurrecting the leadership vocabulary of the Obama 
era (Biden 2020; White House 2021a, 2021b), the Biden 
Administration’s primary concern seems to be to restore 
the US global image rather than its hegemony. This task 
will be complicated both by domestic factors and global 
structural changes, binding Biden to build its foreign policy 
(and transatlantic) agenda on both his predecessors’ 
legacy. 
The balancing act of reconciling Americans with US 
leadership 
With the Democrats regaining control of the Senate (the 
chamber of Congress that plays the leading role in foreign 
policy) following their almost unexpected double victory in 
Georgia’s partial legislative elections on 5 January, Biden 
avoids a cohabitation that would have prevented him from 
implementing his programme. Despite a more favourable 
institutional balance of power, the President will still have 
to perform a balancing act both vis-à-vis the Republicans 
and within the Democratic Party. Vis-à-vis the Republican 
opposition, Biden will have to avoid contributing to a 
further radicalisation of a Republican electorate viscerally 
angry after Trump’s defeat and a Party that intends to take 
its revenge in the 2022 mid-term elections. Biden’s own 
party also poses a challenge as it finds itself polarised 
between a (dominant) liberal-centrist wing to which he 
and his Vice-President Harris belong and an increasingly 
influential left-wing personified by Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez and her ‘Quad’. Although this left-wing rallied 
behind Biden’s candidacy during the election campaign, it 
remains highly critical of the more centrist Democrat’ 
agenda. On both sides, then, the room for manoeuvre of 
the new Administration remains very narrow. 
Furthermore, despite a long career in the Senate that 
made him a foreign affairs expert, Biden will primarily 
focus on tackling the multifaceted domestic crises the US 
is facing: the pandemic, the resulting economic and social 
crises, and the smouldering societal crisis which has been 
corroding American politics and democracy for too long. In 
this regard, the questioning of the 2020 election results by 
Trump and many Republicans and the insurrection at the 
Capitol on 6 January 2021 provided powerful examples of 
the extent to which the US political system is deficient. At 
the same time, the degeneration of the Covid-19 crisis and 
its poor handling by the Trump Administration exposed a 
high level of impotence of the world’s leading power, 
underscoring the need to restore Americans’ plummeting 
confidence in the US.  
Hence, to restore US leadership on the world stage, Biden 
needs to reconcile America with itself as the first condition 
for America’s reconciliation with its leadership on the 
international stage. Furthermore, when Biden claims that 
“America is back”, this does not imply a return to US 
hegemony. Instead, Biden’s foreign policy is bound to 
display much continuity with Obama’s and – maybe more 
surprisingly – Trump’s external agendas.  
Biden’s Obama heritage 
While it has undoubtedly been aggravated by four years of 
‘America First’, the decline of American power is structural 
and does not date back to Trump. Unable to prevent this 
decline, Obama eased the adaptation to this decline 
through a ‘transitional’ foreign policy. This was symbolised 
during his second term by the assertion of his ‘pivot’ 
towards Asia and the ‘leading from behind’ in the Middle 
East and North Africa, both illustrative of a change in the 
White House’s transatlantic mindset.  
Biden’s choice of foreign policy personnel is instructive in 
this regard, notably when it comes to his Secretary of 
State, Antony Blinken. Already a prominent figure of US 
diplomacy in the Obama Administration, Blinken’s 
approach to US foreign policy will revert to a certain extent 
to that of Hillary Clinton and John Kerry. On the one hand, 
this means an EU-friendly approach to transatlantic 
diplomacy, reservations vis-à-vis European far-right 
leaders, and open reluctance towards Russia and Turkey. 
Under Blinken’s leadership, US diplomacy is expected to 
re-join the EU in re-engaging in dialogue with the Iranians 
while being less accommodating towards the Saudis’ 
control of the Gulf and Israel’s settlements expansion. The 
US is also expected to regain leadership in global climate 
negotiations and become a prominent actor in multilateral 
institutions again. On the other hand, this heritage also 
implies pursuing the ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region and 
the withdrawal from the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East, which should be ‘compensated’ by a greater 
responsibility demanded on the part of Europeans, who 
will have to take greater control of their own security 
(notably within NATO). 
Yet, the Biden Administration’s agenda cannot merely be 
reduced to a revival of the Obama years’ foreign policy, 
particularly on the more controversial dossiers, such as the 
Iran deal or the Middle East peace process. Although US 
diplomacy will re-engage – or attempt to re-engage – in 
the dialogue with Iran and preserve the 2015 agreement 
on nuclear weapons from which the Trump Administration 
had illegally and loudly withdrawn, this agreement 
remains strongly criticised from all sides in the US. The 
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criticised by Trump, has therefore already been evoked, 
particularly concerning ballistic missiles – a sine qua non 
condition for the US’s return to the deal. On the Middle 
East peace process, while abandoning the Trump plan, 
Biden announced that he would not backtrack on his 
predecessor’s decision to move the US embassy in Israel 
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.  
Trump’s inevitable legacy 
Biden’s foreign policy will thus also display some aspects 
of continuity with Trump. Although this latter cultivated 
divisions, he managed to rally a large part of the American 
electorate behind the rejection of US exceptionalism. 
Biden may well be a convinced multilateralist and 
transatlanticist. Yet, an internationalist discourse is no 
longer a success recipe. Many US voters do not want their 
government to manage global affairs instead of prioritising 
efforts to solve domestic problems. Biden cannot overlook 
the increasing bipartisan consensus in the US around 
issues such as the need for reforming international 
institutions, a fairer burden-sharing with Europeans, the 
end of the ‘go-to-war’ Middle East policy, and the 
protection of US businesses and jobs in the conduct of 
trade and investment relations. With this in mind, Biden 
aspires to advance “a foreign policy for the middle class” 
(White House 2021a). 
Biden can also not deny the decline of American power 
and the multipolar confrontation between the US and 
other major powers, particularly China. A central 
geopolitical axis at the beginning of the 21st century, the 
Sino-American rivalry represents a durable structural 
phenomenon, no matter who sits in the Oval Office. 
Despite a change in tone to qualify this rivalry, the Biden 
presidency does not, therefore, imply a real revolution in 
relations with Beijing, quite the contrary. Biden will 
undoubtedly try to put an end to the Cold War climate 
created by the rhetoric and policies of the Trump 
Administration. Yet, he does not plan to be any more 
accommodating towards Beijing and its trade competition 
practices, the political and industrial stakes involved in the 
accelerated growth of Chinese information and 
communication technologies (embodied by the 
confrontation around Huawei and 5G), Beijing’s threat in 
the South China Sea and against Taiwan, and breaches of 
the rule of law in Hong Kong.  
In such a context, Biden’s ambition to “reform the habits 
of cooperation and rebuil[d] the muscle of democratic 
alliances that have atrophied over the past few years of 
neglect and … abuse” (White House 2021a) constitutes a 
challenge not only for his Administration but also, from a 
transatlantic standpoint, for EU leaders. His ambition 
means for Europe to seize the opportunity of transforming 
the transatlantic relationship rather than restoring what 
the transatlantic link used to be.  
A more ambitious European agenda for transatlantic 
relations 
In line with their respective “geopolitical Europe” 
(European Commission 2019) and “language of power” 
(Borrell 2020a) discourses, President von der Leyen and 
High Representative Borrell proposed a ‘New Transatlantic 
Agenda’, which they hope will take shape at a US-EU 
summit in the first half of 2021. Presented in their joint 
communication on 2 December 2020 (European 
Commission & High Representative 2020), the roadmap 
they propose is structured around four areas of 
cooperation: the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic, 
climate change and environmental protection, technology 
and trade, and democracy and security. Thus, overall, the 
EU’s offer of cooperation concerns either issue areas 
where Trump’s policies have severely impaired 
cooperation (e.g., security, trade, human rights), others 
where it has been virtually non-existent until very recently 
(e.g., health, digital issues), or areas which have suffered 
from being over-politicised depending on the political 
affiliation of the US Administration in power (e.g., climate 
and the environment). 
Yet, rather than an expectations-based ‘invitation’ to the 
Biden Administration, this ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’ 
could serve as a lynchpin for Europeans to (re)assert their 
collective ambitions. They should propose a transformed 
partnership based on credibility in two key strategic areas 
common to Biden’s foreign policy agenda and the EU’s 
offer, and which constitute the core pillars of a 
‘geopolitical Europe’: trade and security. 
Aiming for full autonomy in trade 
To a large extent, Biden’s agenda on economic 
development and trade policy is concerned with its 
compatibility with the expectations of the US middle class. 
Where Trump halted Obama’s free trade agreements and 
regional trade alliance projects with the EU (Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership – TTIP), Biden has 
understood that the pro-globalisation rhetoric is no longer 
en vogue in the US. Hence, the Biden Administration’s 
trade policy is likely to retain elements of protectionism, 
perhaps not in the same aggressive form as under Trump 
with his tariffs arsenal – particularly against the European 
‘foe’ – but at least in the sense of protecting the American 
market, companies, and jobs (White House 2021a). This 
trend is expected to remain a structuring element of 
transatlantic trade relations, and the EU must accept it as 
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Beyond transatlantic trade per se, where the ‘New 
Transatlantic Agenda’ aims to find “negotiated solutions” 
to trade disagreements and a WTO reform (European 
Commission & High Representative 2020: 7), the EU 
should assert itself more as the arbiter of Sino-US trade 
rivalry than as the collateral victim of a duel in which it 
would have no say. In the systemic competition opposing 
the US and China, the EU has in recent years found itself 
stuck between a historical partner consistently denigrating 
the EU and transatlanticism and an interlocutor whose 
weight on the international scene has been growing 
exponentially over the past decade. In this respect, the EU 
must acknowledge the need to fight China’s unfair 
practices, notably by taking a firm stance alongside the US 
against Chinese illegal practices regarding trade, currency, 
and intellectual property rights abuses, but also by 
increasing conditionality in the face of suspected and 
proven human rights abuses.  
Simultaneously, the EU has been making many steps 
towards China, pursuing its comprehensive engagement 
with China independently from the US. Hence, while the 
arrival in office of the Biden Administration augurs a 
diplomatic improvement in form, in substance the 
continuation of US opposition to China on many issues – 
trade, but also interlinked topics such as digital 
technologies, human rights and regional/security issues – 
may herald a resurgence of transatlantic divergence. In 
this regard, Washington’s reaction to the conclusion in 
principle of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment in December 2020 was hostile. For the Biden 
Administration, it was an act of defiance vis-à-vis the US. 
The EU, by contrast, sees it as a demonstration of its own 
trade agenda’s consistency addressed to all its economic 
partners. 
To avoid getting stuck between a rock and a hard place, 
the EU must aim for full strategic autonomy in trade. 
Although it already enjoys exclusive competence and 
considerable power in trade policy, this remains an 
ambitious task. It requires as a first step further incitation 
for member states and partners, banks, public and private 
companies to use the euro in international transactions – 
notably for strategic exports and imports (e.g., energy, 
health products) – and as a reserve currency. It also 
requires further decoupling from the American financial 
system – especially concerning instant payment systems, 
as transactions are still massively monitored by the US 
authorities. This should provide the EU more 
independence, hence more credibility to face the 
extraterritoriality of US laws, particularly when it comes to 
primary and secondary sanctions, which among others 
prevented the EU from effectively safeguarding the Iran 
nuclear deal following the unilateral US withdrawal under 
Trump.  
A second step could consist in a revision of EU competition 
law to facilitate mergers and contribute to creating 
economic and industrial giants (particularly in the energy 
and digital sectors) capable of competing with American 
and Chinese companies. After all, whether it is about 
exchange currency or industrial groups, if changing the 
rules is impossible, a fair competition requires at least the 
ability to fight with the same weapons.  
Clarifying the terms of the transatlantic security 
relationship 
On democracy and security, through an EU participation in 
the ‘Summit for Democracy’ proposed by Biden and a joint 
approach to human rights and democracy violations, the 
‘New Transatlantic Agenda’ aims to promote a common 
multilateral agenda, strengthening the coordination of 
transatlantic responses to regional instabilities (especially 
in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, but also in the 
Sahel, the Mashreq and the Middle East), preserving the 
2015 Iranian nuclear agreement, further coordinating 
European and American discourse and initiatives vis-à-vis 
China, Russia and Turkey, and establishing a “structured 
EU-US Security and Defence Dialogue” (European 
Commission & High Representative 2020: 10). However, 
where these propositions respond to Biden’s value-based 
foreign policy agenda, they do not advance concrete 
solutions to the deadlock regarding the asymmetric 
transatlantic security bargain. 
Confronted with Trump’s demeaning of transatlanticism, 
the EU has probably made more progress in terms of 
strategic autonomy in security and defence over the last 
four years than ever before (arguably also facilitated by 
the Brexit). EU institutions have elaborated a more 
strategic EU foreign policy discourse based on the 2016 
Global Strategy, proposed an Implementation Plan on 
Security and Defence, launched the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation, created the European Defence Fund under 
the 2021-2027 EU multiannual financial framework, and 
proposed a Strategic Compass to set the EU on the path of 
greater autonomy in security and defence. These projects 
already constitute, as such, a considerable achievement. 
Nonetheless, Trump’s departure and the optimism 
generated by Biden’s renewed commitment to the 
Atlantic Alliance and unequivocal “faith” in Article 5 
(White House 2021b) pose a challenge to the intra-
European debate on strategic autonomy. On the one hand, 
it comforts the advocates of an Atlanticist approach to 
European security, prioritising a strong alignment with the 
US and NATO as the guarantor of the continent’s defence. 
On the other hand, it could halt the progress recently 
made towards greater Europeanisation of defence and risk 
relegating European strategic sovereignty to the 
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allowed within the EU by the break-up initiated under 
Trump. 
While reaffirming their commitment to transatlanticism, 
the EU and its member states should keep pursuing this 
quest for security and defence strategic autonomy and 
credibility and seize the opportunity to reopen a more 
favourable transatlantic dialogue at the highest level to 
redefine the terms of the security relationship. 
Concerning the EU-NATO relationship, EU member states 
that are also NATO members should collectively propose 
to set aside the ‘two per cent rule’ of each member’s GDP 
dedicated to defence. This bookkeeping reasoning has 
been at the centre of the debate on transatlantic burden-
sharing for years but never had any other effect than to 
create tensions among allies, undermine their solidarity 
and the Organisation’s credibility. What was initially 
established as an easy-to-capture median benchmark 
utilised by Obama to trigger Europeans to take greater 
responsibility for their own security was politically 
instrumentalised by Trump to accuse them of a parasitic 
dependence on the US.  
A single target to compare the individual contributions of 
members with very different ambitions to collective 
security is inadequate. A percentage of GDP allocated to 
defence spending is not a relevant indicator for assessing 
national defence planning programmes’ effectiveness. It 
does not accurately reflect military capabilities and 
operational readiness, force modernisation or 
technological upgrading. Furthermore, in times of 
economic contraction due to the pandemic, while national 
defence budgets are likely to be limited, their share in 
national GDPs might increase, resulting in a distortion of 
the measure. A more practical, output-based evaluation 
would clarify each member’s added-value and contribute 
to rebuilding a credible collective security narrative. 
Such clarification would also feed a new collective 
reflection on NATO’s raison d’être. Successively declared 
“obsolete” by US President Trump and “brain dead” by 
French President Macron, facing French-Turkish clashes 
and Turkey’s Russophile inclinations, NATO must consider 
redefining its identity. Faced with new threats emerging 
from regional and global geopolitical reconfigurations and 
long-lasting deadlocks (e.g., Afghanistan, Libya), NATO 
must, as it had done after the end of the Cold War, 
question its purpose. This means updating the 2010 
Strategic Concept, a process in which the EU has to 
participate through its member states. Since transatlantic 
burden-sharing must be fairer and the EU member states’ 
progress on defence cooperation would make the EU 
more responsible for its own security, this NATO strategic 
review process would also help clarify the responsibility-
sharing between the two organisations and among their 
members. 
Finally, repurposing NATO is also a question of the 
collective security agenda and of Europeans showing a 
stronger willingness to take their responsibilities on 
regional issues and actually assuming them. This must be 
the case in the Eastern neighbourhood, where the EU 
remained a spectator of the conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, letting Russia play its role of 
hegemonic referee between two members of the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership. This must also be the case in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, where Europeans 
have kept a low profile in the Lebanon crisis and remain 
spectators of the escalation of tensions resulting from the 
consolidation of a block newly formed by Israel and the 
Arab powers of the Gulf against Iran. 
Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the Trump presidency, pursuing the 
objective of a ‘geopolitical Europe’ requires the EU to 
clarify its strategic ambitions and implies a more balanced 
relationship with the US. While following a European 
agenda, the EU must lead the discussions on issues that 
are not only high on its own, but also on the Biden 
Administration’s foreign policy agendas to become a 
coherent and credible force for proposals. On key matters, 
particularly trade and security, the EU and its member 
states should collectively reflect on what strategic 
autonomy entails so as to formulate common objectives 
more clearly. For if the EU’s construction has historically 
benefitted from a powerful transatlantic partnership, it is 
today a strong, credible and strategically autonomous EU 
on which the solidity of a renewed transatlantic 
relationship depends. 
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